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Timothy Rothhaar

The Outcast Individual:
Abraham and Affliction in the
Broader Society
Introduction
The philosophers Søren Kierkegaard and Simone Weil lived almost a hundred years apart, yet their ideas intersect especially with regard to the relationship of the individual to God. Intriguing are the similarities between Kierkegaard and Weil and how each constructs the faith of the individual amidst great
spiritual and social upheaval, as they use their own lives to shed light on the human condition. For Kierkegaard, this task was done in the course of a modernity
that, as he saw it, was losing its faith in God as a result of Hegelian philosophical
idealism. Weil, on the other hand, was caught in the middle of her dedication to
the plight of French workers and the rise of the Third Reich in the early stages
of World War II.
Though not alive at the same time, each thinker tackled similar issues in
philosophy, most notably—as Kierkegaard puts it—the teleological suspension
of the ethical sphere of existence. The point of this paper will be to describe,
compare, and contrast the teleological suspension of the ethical realm as found
in Kierkegaard’s exposition on the story of Abraham and Isaac in his book Fear
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and Trembling,1 with Weil’s understanding of affliction found in her essay “The
Love of God and Affliction.”2 Before this inquiry, I must first describe what Kierkegaard3 deems are the three spheres of existence and how the teleological
suspension of the ethical works.
What are the Three Spheres of Existence?
Kierkegaard regards all individuals as falling into one of three spheres of
existence or stages in life: the aesthetic sphere, the ethical sphere, and the religious sphere.4 Each sphere is named according to the main practice by which
one lives. In other words, what one believes is not the object that determines
which sphere an individual falls into; it is how one lives that determines which
sphere one is in.
To be in the aesthetic sphere, the lowest sphere, is to live one’s life according to the pleasure principle: the seeking of immediate gratification and the
avoidance of pain. The aesthete focuses on ideas, particularly associated with art,
literature, fashion, and the people and places of the upper class. He lacks freedom, which for Kierkegaard is the possibility of giving one’s life meaning and
direction; for the aesthete goes to great lengths to avoid any kind of committed,
long-term relationship with another human being. Boredom, says Kierkegaard,
is the downfall of the aesthete. The constant seeking of new, and mostly lavish,
experiences becomes tedious. Recognizing the irony of his situation, he makes
1. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition: Repetition, vol. 6, in Kierkegaard’s Writings,
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
2. Simone Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” in Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd
(New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973).
3. It should be clarified that Fear and Trembling was written pseudonymously by Kierkegaard, as
were many of his works. The pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling is Johannes de Silentio ( John of Silence). Though Kierkegaard writes pseudonymously in Fear and Trembling, for the
purposes of this paper, the ideas referred to will be treated as Kierkegaard’s, though he may not have
espoused the views he presented pseudonymously, as Kiekegaard himself discusses in his journals.
4. The aesthetic and ethical spheres are treated in his book Either/Or, while the religious sphere is
treated in Fear and Trembling.
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the transition into the ethical sphere.
The ethical person is in some ways “the exact opposite of the aesthete.”5
Existing in the ethical sphere denotes a recognition of right and wrong in the
moral sense. Hence, to live ethically is to take on a moral code as one’s own in
order to benefit the larger community.6 (The ethical sphere, for Kierkegaard,
has its basis somewhat in the arena of politics, as a community is often based
on written laws.) Yet there is something added to the ethical life that makes
it a higher, so to speak, form of existence: freedom (and by extension responsibility). While the aesthete is preoccupied with avoidance of commitment,
the ethical individual embraces it—whether in the form of a marriage or social
relationship—as “[participation] in a community.”7 Through all of the personal
choices and tasks taken up by the ethical person, it is still not enough to prevent
the individual from slipping into despair. One is constantly battling selfish motivations and desires, while attempting to obtain some form of moral perfection.
Because one’s identity is based on the world around oneself, the ethical individual, when faced with the dilemma of a world that can change in an instant,
is changed accordingly, causing inner confusion. The seriousness of trying to be
perfect is exhibited within oneself as humorous, since there is simultaneously a
realization of the paradox of the situation: the longing for moral perfection will
never be attained on one’s own. The religious sphere is where one finds a new
way of existing.
The final sphere of existence is called the religious sphere, where the existence of the individual is based upon his or her relationship to God. In the
religious sphere, one knows oneself to be a sinner and needs God’s help, forgiveness, and grace to live a just life. The idea of eternal life in God’s presence—
salvation—is accepted “in faith and with passion”8 subjectively. Thus, there is
5.
6.
7.
8.

Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Continuum, 2006), 78.
Beneficial insofar as the individual seeks good for others and not only self.
Carlisle, Kierkegaard: Guide for the Perplexed, 79.
Ibid., 80.
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an emphasis on the paradoxical nature of the religious sphere: that salvation
is only to be had through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ (the infinite, eternal
God taking on the finite, temporal human form).9 Salvation is needed because of
sin—separation between God and man—and can only be initiated by God as he
is untainted by it. As the individual comes to accept the limitations on life due
to sin, one sacrifices material concerns for the sake of a next life, in the hope that
one might find happiness eternally. Again, there is a paradox here: while the religious individual is found in the world, the individual is no longer of the world.
Worldly things are not the primary focus of life. Interaction with the world is
always checked by what the individual recognizes as God’s will.
Genesis 22 and its Implications
The story is told in Genesis 22 of the Biblical patriarch Abraham, who is
commanded by God to make a human sacrifice of his son, Isaac, for no apparent reason. On the surface, it appears that Abraham is going to commit an act of
maniacal murder. Furthermore, the dilemma is momentous because God orders
Abraham to obey a command that not only goes against moral reasonableness
but also violates a promise God had previously made to Abraham. In Genesis
12, God had promised Abraham that his people would inherit the land of Israel.
Since Isaac was understood by Abraham to be the person through whom that
promise would be fulfilled, and since Isaac had no children, killing him would
nullify God’s previous word, making God hypocritical.
Now, Abraham considered obedience to God’s command his duty. Yet,
what God was here asking Abraham to do was morally wrong10 and he had no
way out of his commitment to God. It is certainly the case that Abraham was not
a Christian who would ask forgiveness in the Christian way. He was, however,
9. Kierkegaard never says outright that Christianity is the culmination of the religious sphere, but
given his language, one can name it as Christianity.
10. Even though this narrative predates the injunction in the Ten Commandments, “Thou shall
not kill,” it is assumed that morality, by virtue of natural law, would have been valued nonetheless.
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asked to believe in what appears to be a contradiction in God, similar to the
Christian dilemma: Abraham is told he is to be the father of a nation and then
asked to murder that nation; likewise a Christian is asked to believe in a God
who is at the same time both God and man. Hence, were Abraham a Christian,
the situation of killing one’s own son would be (nearly) identical—identical
enough, at least for Kierkegaard—to Abraham’s situation, which qualifies him
to be considered as making the journey into the religious sphere.
What is the Teleological Suspension of the
Ethical?
Under the ethical sphere, the individual is subjected to what Kierkegaard
calls the “universal.” As was stated in the section on the three spheres of existence, the ethical sphere requires an individual to relate to the community,
the group, by means of a moral code. Thus, the universal is this relationship
between the individual and the group—one might think of it as a kind of social
contract.
The Greek word telos means “end” or “purpose” and to suspend the ethical
is to push it away in favor of something else. Hence, to teleologically suspend
the ethical is to put the ethical sphere, including the universal, aside for a higher
purpose: This higher purpose is the single individual as he stands in relationship
to God.
How does the individual relate to the ethical and
religious spheres?
What Kierkegaard means to say—in regards to the individual’s relationship to the religious and ethical—is that an individual’s direct, personal relationship with God (the religious) is higher than, or comes before, his relationship
with the rest of the world (the ethical). For instance, before one looks at how the
world views one’s lifestyle and choices, one must first look to God as the source
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of one’s worth (spiritual, moral, etc.). After “being subordinate as the single individual to the universal”11 (i.e. obeying social morality), Abraham’s obedience
now surpasses the universal via the universal itself and places himself in direct relation to God in choosing to go against the ethical/universal by “attempting”12 to
murder his son Isaac. In order to rise above the ethical (or community) sphere,
one thinks of himself this way13 by allowing himself to be judged according to
God’s standards or commands, not one’s given society. If one permits his lifestyle to be reflective of his given community’s without “checking in with God”
first (so to speak), then he has relegated himself to the ethical sphere.
The teleological suspension of the ethical in Fear
and Trembling
Kierkegaard describes faith as “precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal.”14 This definition
means that an individual’s actions are greater than a social morality. Abraham’s choice to sacrifice Isaac is greater than the universal moral norm of “do
not murder” because his choice was made, not only in faith, but as the “single
individual”15: choosing not as one who is part of a whole society , but who is
the whole himself. Abraham decides not to act on what he believes is right and
wrong, but what is commanded of him regardless of whether it is right or wrong
according to the ethical standard. When the single individual takes it upon himself to act, not in opposition to the ethical, but for reasons that the ethical cannot explain, he is “justified before it…as superior.”16
11. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 55–56.
12. Abraham shows more of a willing, rather than mere attempting.
13. As well as acting like it.
14. Ibid.
15. The single individual is just that: a single individual. Singularity is important to the effect that
it emphasizes alienation from the rest of one’s community, whereas the individual is emphasized in
order to show that there is no escaping the responsibility one has for one’s choices.
16. Ibid.
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Because Abraham is still living in the world, he is under the universal. Yet,
because he as an individual is acting according to faith, that is, placing his actions above the universal in that they could be considered wrong via the ethical
point of view, but righteous for one who can see beyond the mere duty of the
ethical, Abraham goes beyond the ethical and enters the religious sphere. For
the ethical sphere, this movement is objectively immoral, but for the individual
who is obeying God’s command, it is beyond morality.
Kierkegaard describes Abraham as a “knight of faith”17: one who is like the
“knight of infinite resignation” in giving up the finite and temporal world, but
who receives it back “by virtue of the absurd.”18 Abraham’s situation is unique in
that God promised his descendants the land to where he was told to migrate.19
Instead of simply giving up Isaac for all eternity (i.e. infinite resignation), Abraham has faith that God will not actually require Isaac of him. There is a contradiction here that fascinates Kierkegaard: God will and will not take Isaac from
Abraham. What makes Abraham a knight of faith is that he understands God
cannot require both of these things of him at the same time, yet he must plunge
into faith without question, for he knows not how God will or can resolve this
conflict. The knight of faith does not know what God will do, but has faith that
God knows what he is doing.
Weil’s Understanding of Affliction
The French word from which affliction translates is malheur. While malheur contains “a sense of inevitability and doom,”20 which the English word “af17. Kierkegaard’s knights are both individuals that have given up the finite world insofar as both
have renounced its power over them and focused instead on the spiritual world. Yet, there is a key
difference: the knight of infinite resignation cannot accept happiness in the finite world, because he
cannot believe that it is possible to find it, while the knight of faith gains the world back, believing
that happiness is possible because God will provide for him.
18. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 57.
19. Genesis 12:7.
20. Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” 117.
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fliction” lacks, the latter will be a sufficient translation. Weil’s idea of affliction
came from her contact with the factory workers in France whose abuse and defilement was so horrible that Weil believed she encountered an all-together different form of existence.
“Affliction is an uprooting of life, a more or less attenuated equivalent of
death, made irresistibly present to the soul by the attack or immediate apprehension of physical pain.”21 It has a meaninglessness about it, with the inability
to name the significance of that meaninglessness. It contains a feeling of moral
ambiguity, as a person is made concurrently the perpetrator and the victim of
the same crime.22 All of these attributes are simultaneously present in one of the
afflicted.
Examples of affliction, indicative of the qualities noted, can be found
amidst the Holocaust. Of the innumerable crimes committed, there is one in
particular that illuminates the characteristics of affliction. The story is told about
a group of men told to line up in a concentration camp.23 Of those that were
standing, another man was placed behind one of them. He is told by an SS officer to choke the man in front of him to death, or else the entire line of men will
be shot to death. The man asked to be a murderer is in a predicament: either he
murders one man of his own accord or he indirectly murders an entire line of
them. He does not have a way out, for no right will be done, only a wrong. Whatever he chooses, his innocence is wiped out: he is the perpetrator of a crime and
the victim of one.
In affliction, a person experiences distress of mind and body at the same
time. Weil differentiates between strictly physical pain, pain only of the mind,
and pain caused by affliction. A “toothache is an example [of physical pain].
An hour or two of violent pain caused by a decayed tooth is nothing once it is
21. Ibid., 118.
22. Whatever that crime may be.
23. Sarah MacMillen, untitled lecture (lecture, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 13,
2009).
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over.”24 If the suffering is only in the mind, meaning “not bound up with physical pain or something analogous,”25 then it is not affliction, since all one must
do is change one’s mindset. Pain of mind is simply suffering, not affliction. Suffering can have meaning. As Christianity teaches, a person can make suffering
meaningful by a mental adjustment.26 Affliction, however, is much deeper than
“ordinary” suffering. With affliction, there is a constant physical pain that does
not simply “go away,” whatever that pain might be. As a matter of fact, it worsens
the affliction. Because affliction causes a person to experience physical pain, that
very same physical pain causes a mental acknowledgment of one’s own state,
thus intensifying the affliction.
Another key aspect of affliction is its similarity to slavery. Weil quotes
“the men of antiquity,” saying, “A man loses half his soul the day he becomes a
slave.”27 Just as a slave’s entire being is taken over by his existence as a slave, so
too is the soul branded with affliction’s “own particular mark,”28 that of slavery.
One becomes a slave to affliction because, “little by little [affliction makes] the
soul its accomplice,”29 similar to Stockholm syndrome or a learned helplessness.
At some point, the soul30 believes it will not escape the afflicted condition; in a
sense, it befriends the affliction. It causes the afflicted to “[stop] seeking a way of
deliverance” that he might “plunge into it again”31 should he make it through affliction the first time. Affliction becomes something of a “parasite [as if it] were
directing him to suit its own purposes,”32 tricking one into thinking that there is
24. Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” 118.
25. Ibid., 17.
26. For example, if one says to oneself, “I will suffer for the glory of God,” then one is consoled
and is therefore not afflicted. Once suffering has some value or meaning, it is no longer affliction.
27. Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” 117.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 122.
30. Or the afflicted person.
31. Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” 123.
32. Ibid.
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no hope for his situation.
What is the individual’s relationship to
affliction?
The main relationship to affliction is one of inconsolability. The kind of
plague that affliction generates within the life and soul of an individual is too
deep and acute to be helped. Weil goes so far as to state that “only God can [set
one free from past affliction]...and even the grace of God itself cannot cure irremediably wounded nature here below.”33 Yet, “affliction would not have this
power without the element of chance contained by it,”34 for chance instills a
certain fear in the individual, as though affliction could happen at any moment.
While everyone may suffer in life, not everyone experiences affliction. The
circumstances for each individual are different: “The same event may plunge
one human being into affliction and not another.”35 It is personalized to fit each
person, since it can happen anywhere at any time, though one knows not in
what form affliction comes, nor when. The only possible means of defense, according to Weil, is to “persevere in love,”36 since God is love and created out of
love (and only God can remove affliction).
The Suspension of the Ethical in Weil
As with Kierkegaard, the ethical sphere for Weil concerns an individual’s
moral obligation to the community. Weil, however, places a much greater emphasis on the ethical, because in order for affliction to occur, there must be “social degradation or the fear of it in some form or another.”37 Social alienation is
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid.
Ibid., 125.
Ibid., 119.
Ibid., 124. She later says that love is “a direction and not a state of the soul.” Ibid., 135.
Ibid., 119.
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experienced as a result of the inability of one to communicate one’s own situation of affliction with the community. An individual in this situation is separated
from the rest of the group because of the subjectivity of the circumstance. Since
the community cannot help the afflicted, the person is left alone in this afflicted
condition without any source of human consolation.
Kiekegaard and Weil: Similarities
There are several areas of overlap in the suspension of the ethical realm
that I would now like to explore. They are meaningful/lessness, moral ambiguity and misinterpretation, and alexithymia (inability to express one’s feelings).
I. Meaningfulness and Meaninglessness
The meaningfulness found in the teleological suspension of the ethical is
found in Kierkegaard’s treatment of God’s transcendence. God, for Kierkegaard,
is beyond the realm of the ethics, as shown. For Abraham to suspend the ethical in the way he did shows that—at least for the knight of faith—meaning is
not found in the finite world. Meaning is found in the eternal. Only by obeying
the eternal command of God could Abraham hope to find any meaning in his
actions towards Isaac. The ethical individual could never experience this hope,
which is another reason why the suspension of the ethical places the individual
above the ethical: on top of standing in singularity before God, it gives meaning to one’s life. For Kierkegaard, God’s transcendence makes meaningfulness
possible. In affliction, however, God’s transcendence is meaninglessness, since
this transcendence is sign of the absence of God. Furthermore, since God is not
present, and God is love, then love is absent in affliction. Perhaps what is most
important about this aspect of affliction is its antinomian attribute. The antinomianism of affliction lies in the afflicted person’s struggle for survival; affliction
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is Ananke38 and, therefore, not subject to law and beyond any judgment of good
and evil.
II. Moral ambiguity and Misinterpretation
Perhaps the largest objection to the teleological suspension of the ethical
is that it leaves one with a sense of moral ambiguity. Because Abraham is commanded by God, who is the source of all that is good and right, to murder his
only son, one questions the morality of the religious sphere. The suspension of
the ethical requires one to act on the God-given mandate. If one is asked to disregard one of God’s prior statements, then one has no choice but to act on what
God commands at that moment. What causes confusion on the part of the individual is what Kierkegaard calls the paradox of faith, which “may be expressed in
this way…in this relationship of duty the single individual relates himself as the
single individual absolutely to the absolute.”39
Though mentioned earlier, it should be noted that in this relation, one
may misinterpret what God requires. In being set apart from the ethical sphere,
the individual may sacrifice his relationship with the rest of the world in such
a way that is displeasing to God. For example, God may not demand that the
individual completely and permanently sever any and every form of communication with the outside world but rather put it on hold for a little while, as
with Abraham’s sacrifice. Therefore, if the individual (mis)interprets God’s message in such a way that he begins to live in disconcert with God’s command, the
only way he could change his living otherwise would be to speak about it, which
would indicate that the individual is really living in the ethical sphere.40
38. “A personification of compelling necessity or ultimate fate to which even the gods must yield.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, s.v. “ananke,” http://unabridged.merriamwebster.com (accessed July 30, 2011). Ananke in this sense refers to force as caught up in an all
against all battle.
39. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 70.
40. As one will see, speechlessness is a sign of correct standing with God.
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One aspect of affliction that is not so much a controversy as it is a travesty is that affliction gives one a feeling of moral ambiguity. It is even expected,
given the earlier example. Like the suspension of the ethical, affliction removes
a person from good and evil, but in a different way. When Abraham ‘suspends
the ethical,’ he does it as an act of faith, whereas with affliction, this suspension
is resolved from the amoral position of the soul. Since affliction relativizes the
soul’s judgment of right and wrong, it actually deconstructs and destroys the
morality of the person.
III. Alexithymia
A unique characteristic of Abraham’s situation is his utter silence when
faced with who to tell about his situation. Kierkegaard takes this up in the third
section of Fear and Trembling titled, “Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham
to Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?” Abraham seems to experience alexithymia,41 which is a condition whereby one experiences an event so traumatic that one cannot speak of it. Abraham cannot tell
anyone of what God has commanded of him, for it is beyond words; no one can
understand what it is he is going through. Even if he attempts to communicate
it with others, he will have exited the religious sphere,42 for language is of the
ethical sphere.
The suspension of the ethical is expressed through alexithymia in this way:
the actual silence of an individual who has been given a command from God
is no different than that of another individual who is also silent. The only dif41. Alexithymia translates from the Greek as “without words for emotion.”
42. The ethical sphere includes laws, which individuals are supposed to obey. These laws can
only be understood by a large amount of people because they are put into language, a language that
everyone can understand. The religious sphere does away with this language because the personal
relationship with God overrides any form of communication with others in that the relationship is
attuned to the individual, and thus the individual’s life circumstances. Therefore, only that individual
can even begin to try to understand what God is commanding of him because the commands are
strictly specific—only an individual can carry them out.
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ference between the two is that the religious individual’s situation “cannot be
translated into real life,”43 that is, cannot be spoken of or discussed.
Correspondingly, a person cannot explain what is happening to him in
affliction, for language is taken away. As stated by Weil, “[the afflicted] have no
words to express what is happening to them.”44 It is seemingly the same situation as Abraham’s, except it moves in an opposite direction: Abraham’s silence
is hopeful, but the silence of affliction is despairing. There is no way to numb
the pain of affliction, for if there were a cure, one could not voice it. As language
is taken away, so is meaningfulness.45 Even those individuals who have been in
contact with others who experience affliction can never truly know what it is unless experienced themselves, for “affliction is something specific and impossible
to describe in any other terms…”46
Conclusion
In order to understand the suspension of the ethical, one must understand
where the ethical fits into existence and the role it plays. It is possible that the
moral of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is that faith is something which cannot be calculated. Kierkegaard uses Abraham as his example for faith because
Abraham is completely dependent on God as a single individual: There is no
group or community to help him understand his task—or what he is to do—
for he must do it himself. The ethical sphere is about following a community’s
institutionalized norms and the religious is, in some sense, a breaking away from
the institution. Kierkegaard creates the religious sphere to combat the politics of
the passionless Danish Lutheran Church, which was part of his reason for writing Fear and Trembling. A community cannot tell an individual how to act in a
43. Carlisle, Kierkegaard: Guide for the Perplexed, 129.
44. Weil, “The Love of God and Affliction,” 120.
45. It should also be noted that thought is taken away. Since affliction is beyond suffering, there is
no thinking out of it.
46. Ibid.
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relationship to God, to the effect that the individual must still choose his own
life, that is, he must discern on his own what is the best way to act and therefore
live. Ultimately, Kierkegaard’s point is that one’s personal relationship to God
should not take place at the ethical level because it is individual47 and institutions
have a tendency to corrupt individual belief. Thus, the individual in his faith has
a tendency to be suspicious of groupthink and community norms.
Similarly, Weil’s notion of affliction places the individual outside the realm
of suffering and into a state of slavery, which is affliction. The ethical sphere is
suspended because society cannot help the afflicted cope: the afflicted state is
beyond the boundaries of human classification and logic. Seemingly, the individual is all alone, left to live in one’s own prison, unable but striving to love
in a condition of meaninglessness. Weil’s afflicted individual, like Abraham, is
an outsider to society, without fellowship, and belonging nowhere. Eventually,
the afflicted individual may find his soul again and escape affliction, but only
through a constant striving toward love.

47.

Individual as it is a singular experience for each human being.

